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TOWARD IMPROVED HOUSING OPPORTUNITIES:
A NEW DIRECTION FOR ZONING LAW
The problems arising from the present state of the law applica-
ble to land development in American suburbs by now are familiar.
It is a commonplace to observe that Euclidean zoning's static ap-
proach was doomed to disappoint in a dynamic world. The poverty
of the conventional "solution"-resort to the amendment process-
has likewise become clear with its abuse in the service of discrimina-
tory and exclusionary motives. The indifference of suburban zoning
authorities to regional interests is also notorious. And, tragically, the
desperate shortage of decent low- and moderate-income housing pre-
sents a problem so familiar that concern, if ever it existed, has long
since turned to apathy.
In combination, however, these difficulties and problems have de-
fied conventional, legal solution. Certainly the courts have been ill-
equipped to unravel the snarl. And legislative attempts have largely
been unimaginative and incomplete.
This Comment proposes a direct confrontation with, and an at-
tempt to resolve, all of these problems. The weapons suggested-the
planned unit development and the imposition of quotas-are not novel,
and perhaps the thrust will strike many as too simple. In its favor,
however, must be the fact that it might work where more sophisticated
approaches have failed.
Accordingly, it is recommended that state legislatures require
local communities to establish two-part development quotas. Com-
munities should be called upon to determine how much growth they
may reasonably be expected to absorb over a five-year period, and how
much of the over-all growth would constitute their fair share of regional
needs for low- and moderate-income housing. To make possible satis-
faction of the latter quota, communities should be expected to require
that all developments of a certain size allocate an appropriate per-
centage of their dwelling units to low- and moderate-income housing.
A state reviewing agency should be created with broad relief-granting
powers, so as to assure that local communities do not neglect their
responsibilities.
I. ELEMNTS OF THE PROBLEM
Prior to closer scrutiny of this Comment's recommendations, a
further examination of the problem it seeks to resolve is in order. We
shall consider first this country's housing crisis, and then shall review
the state of contemporary zoning law-the fallacy of end-state zoning,
the ease with which amendment procedures lend themselves to illegiti-
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mate purposes, and the disregard of regional needs. Finally, this portion
of the Comment will discuss the inadequacy of judicial handling of
these difficulties, for this is truly an area where institutions not part of
a solution have become part of the problem.
A. Housing in America
In 1949 Congress recognized the problem of an inadequate hous-
ing supply; 1 there is no doubt that lack of adequate housing is still a
serious national2 problem. The Supreme Court has recognized the press-
ing importance of housing,3 and numerous executive studies have con-
cluded that better housing will be crucial to the solution of urban
problems.4 Yet despite all the studies and recommendatibns, little of
substance has been accomplished to alleviate the problem of inadequate
housing for the poor
The realization has grown in recent years that public housing is
not a complete answer.' It has been attacked for its cost, mammoth size,
ineffective management, institutional design, short supply, and discrim-
inatory site-selection process. 7
Relying upon private large-scale development, with governmental
assistance, to provide low- and moderate-income housing as a comple-
ment to public housing is consistent with our tradition of leaving land-
use decisions to the market place and turning to the government only to
adjust imperfections.8 If private construction of low- and moderate-
income housing works, in all likelihood it will not serve the really poorf
1 See Housing Act of 1949 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970); accord, Department of
Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 §§ 1-10, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3531-37 (1970). See
also Fair Housing Act of 1968 § 801-901, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 (1970) (making illegal
discrimination in the sale, rental, or financing of housing).
2 See, e.g., Johnston, Developments in Land-Use Control, 45 NOTRE DA=nX LAW. 399,
408-13 (1970).
8 See Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969) ; Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392
U.S. 409 (1968); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S.
1 (1948); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
But see Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
4 See NATIONAL ADVISORY CoMM'r oN Cv DisoiDERs, R PORT 257 (1968) [here-
inafter cited as KEENER REPORT]; U.S. PaESmaNT's Comx'N ON URBAN HousING, A
DECENT HOr. (1968) [hereinafter cited as KAjsER REroRT].
5 See NATIONAL Coamr' oN URBAN PROBlEmS, BUILDIN THE AiucAN CITY, H.R.
Doc. No. 91-34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 13-16, 153-54 (1969) [hereinafter cited as DOUGLAS
REPORT]; KEEmR REPORT, supra note 4, at 259-60; Rouse & Wehbring, Housing as a
National Priority, 39 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 674 (1971).
0 See, e.g., Breckenfeld, Housing Subsidies Are a Grand Delusion, FoRTUNE, Feb. 1972,
at 136. See also N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1972, at 1, col. 5.
7KERNER RFP ORT, supra note 4, at 260; Ledbetter, Public Housing-A Social Ex-
periment Seeks Acceptance, 32 LAW & CONTBIP. PROB. 490 (1967). The most serious
criticism has been leveled at site selection: local authorities, frequently influenced by racial
motives, have tended to place public housing projects in or near ghetto areas. See, e.g.,
Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971.
8 See J. DELrAONS, LAND-USE CONTROLs IN THs UNITED STATES 7 (2d ed. 1969).
See also Klaman, Public/Private Approaches to, Urban Mortgage and Housing Problems,
32 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB. 250 (1967).
9 See Genung, Public Housing-Success or Failure?, 39 Go. WASH:. L. Rxv. 734
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In this situation, public housing is perhaps the only answer, but there
is no doubt that private programs will alleviate pressures on public
housing programs. °
What must not be lost sight of, however, is that the decisions of
private developers or of federal or state agencies are not sufficient. The
last word belongs, in practice, to the local community, and exclusionary
zoning techniques (of which, more will be said shortly) can easily
scuttle desirable projects. This Comment urges that future plans for
improved low-income-housing placement come directly to grips with
this crucial factor.
B. Zoning
Zoning law has served, perhaps more than any other factor, to
aggravate the housing crisis. As originally conceived, it did not allow
for flexible development. This failing found remedy with the exploita-
tion of the amendment process-a remedy, however, as bad as or worse
than the disease itself, from the standpoint of those who feel low- and
moderate-income housing should have a place in suburban settings.
Further adding to the difficulty is the fragmentary approach necessarily
entailed by present-day land-use decisionary structures: the absence
of a body responsible for promoting regional needs on a basis even-
handed with respect to the region's smaller-community interests, makes
understandable the apprehensions suburban planners might feel about
taking more than their "share" of low-income residents.
1. Flexibility
A brief examination of Euclidean zoning will show that its theory
is inconsistent with reality, in that it provides townships with neither
the flexibility to deal effectively and sensitively with developers on a
case-by-case basis nor the discretion to respond adequately to changing
circumstances and preferences.
Suburban zoning in the United States is for the most part based on
the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (SZEA), 11 ordaining that all
land be divided into districts according to use and that within each
district the regulations be uniform." Such districts reflect a built-in
resistance to new design and change, since they are established with
reference to the state of development at the time of the zoning plan's
adoption. New development must be at least similar to existing uses.
Since the dominant, and highest, use in suburban zoning is the single-
family detached dwelling,'" few developers have sought to build any-
(1971); Roisman, The Right to Public Housing, 39 GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 691 (1971). See
generally KAisER REPORT, supra note 4.
10 See Ledbetter, supra note 7, at 527.
11 STANDARD STAT ZONING ExABLING AcT (U.S. Dep't of Commerce, rev. ed. 1926).
See generally 1 R. ANDERSON, AmERICAN LAW or ZONING § 3.11 (1968).
12 SZEA § 2; see R. ANDERsoN, supra note 11, §§ 3.13, 8.02.
13 'Tromotion of the single-family home ... is deemed good public policy in Amer-
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thing else-producing the "cookie-cutter" pattern of urban sprawl. 4
Municipalities and developers, planners and potential homeowners,
have of late grown dissatisfied with conventional, single-family-
detached, lot-by-lot subdivisions and have sought more flexible and
imaginative approaches to land development. 5 The answer, frequently,
has been planned unit development-both a new design technique and
a new method of local land-use control.
Regulations for a planned unit development (PUD), unlike con-
ventional zoning, do not apply to individual lots but pertain rather to
the entire development area. The approach calls for a substantial
amount of administrative discretion and does away with the concept of
sharply segregating land uses. 6 Grouping dwelling units, especially
townhouses and apartments, into clusters is a more efficient use of land
which both frees land for common open space and permits the devel-
oper to build at higher densities without overcrowding.17 Housing costs
can be reduced, since streets, pavements, and networks of utilities can
be shorter.' In addition to the predictable amenities-common open
space and recreational areas-PUDs often include non-residential uses,
such as shopping and employment centers. 9
As a regulatory device, the PUD system recognizes that most
homebuilding today is done on a large scale by corporate developers
20
and attempts to strike a balance between the developer's desire to vary
ica." Bettman, Constitutionality of Zoning, 37 HARv. L. RaV. 834, 839-40 (1924). Cf.
R. BABCOCK, THE ZONINGGAiM 127 (1966).
14 See generally F. BossmAN, ALTERNATIVES TO URBAN SPRAWL: LEGAL GUmEL E
FOR GaoyRNTAL AcTroN (National Comm'n on Urban Problems Research Report No.
15, 1968); Gorlick, Control of Urban Sprawl, California Style, 2 URBAN LAw. 95 (1970).
15 See URBAN LAND INsTIrruT [ULI, THE PROS AND CONS OF CLUSTER HOUSING
(1969) [hereinafter cited as CLUSTER HousING]; ULI, TECH. BUrL. No. 62, NEw
ZONING LANDmARKs IN PLAN E UNIT DEvELOP NTS (1968); ULI, TECH. BUrL. No.
61, APARTMENT CoiMUNITIEs-THiE NExT BIG MAR=i (1968); ULI, TECH. BUL. No.
57, OPEN SPACE COMM-UNITIES IN THE AIAIAET PLACE (1966); ULI, TECH. BULL. No. 52,
LEGAL ASPECTS Or PLANNED UNIT RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT (1965) [hereinafter cited
as LEGAL ASPECTS]; ULI, TECH. BU . No. S0, T=E HomEs AssocATIoN HANBOOx
(1964); ULI, TEC. BULL. No. 47, INNOVATIONS VS TRADITIONS IN Col UNrIT DEVELOP-
m:ENT (1963) [hereinafter cited as INNOVATIONS]; ULI, TECH. BU .L. No. 40, NEW
APPROACHES TO REsmENTIAL LAND DEVELOPIENT (1961); W. VYTE, CLUSTER DEVELOP-
MENT (1964); Goldston & Scheuer, Zoning of Planned Residential Developments, 73
HARv. L. REV. 241 (1959).
'OSee generally Symposium-Planned Unit Development, 114 U. PA. L. Rsv. 3
(1965).
17 Cluster housing has been defined as "the elimination of arbitrary lot sizes and the
utilization of a minimum of ten percent of the land for common area amenities." CUSTER
Housm, supra note 15, at 6.
1sSee, e.g., INNOVATIONS, supra note 15, at 24-26, 93-95; FHA, LAND PLANNNO
BULL. No. 6, PLANNED-UNIT DEVELOPMENT WITH A HOMES AssocIuIoN 3 (1963). But
see CLUSTER HOUSING, supra note 15, at 19-23, 24; Krasnowiecki, Planned Unit Develop-
ment: A Challenge to Established Theory and Practice of Land Use Control, 114 U. PA.
L. REv. 47, 50-52 (1965).
19 M. Rivkin, Planned Unit Development: Its Significance for New Communities,
Nov. 3-6, 1971 (paper prepared for the American Institute of Architects, New Com-
munities Conferences).
2 OSee, e.g., Hank6, Planned Unit Development and Land Use Intensity, 114 U. PA.
L. RFv. 15, 15-17 (1965).
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uses within a single tract and the community's desires to see quality
development and to feel it can rely on what the developer has prom-
ised.2' Generally, the developer must convince the local governing body
that his plan would serve the community's best interest. The de-
veloper, the local legislators, and the planning commission work to-
gether; the plan can be modified at the authorities' request.2" After final
approval, the administrative agency has considerable discretion, even
to the extent of permitting certain alterations.24
In short, the PUD technique allows a community to exercise more
refined, particularized control over larger, more sophisticated develop-
ment. What is often overlooked, however, is its tremendous potential
to provide housing for low- and moderate-income families.2 5 This
Comment urges that that potential be exploited.
2. Amendments Discretionary and Discriminatory
Early advocates of zoning believed that development patterns
could be predetermined,2 6 and therefore saw no need to provide a role
for discretion.2 7 The SZEA provides that "regulations shall be made in
accordance with a comprehensive plan" 2 8 -a plan prepared by extra-
polating from the existing uses of land, the township's appearance
twenty or thirty years in the future.29 This approach to land-use con-
trols has been characterized as "end-state" zoning, because it attempts
to ordain future conditions without admitting of the possibility that
changing circumstances may necessitate different goals, and because it
neglects to detail intermediate stages or to provide tools to achieve the
desired or contemplated end-state3 0 This is in accord, of course, with
the conventional wisdom of free-enterprise economics: the community
does not (and, it was thought, should not) make development deci-
sions. Economic initiative follows control of the means of production;
21See, e.g., D. ANELxER, CONTROLLiNG PLANNED RESmENTIAL DEVELOPMENT
(1966); Krasnowiecki, supra note 18, at 78-97; LEGAL ASPECTS, supra note 15.
2 2 See Babcock, McBride & Krasnowiecki, A Model State Enabling Act with Com-
mentary for Planned Unit Residential Development, in LEGAL ASPECTS, supra note 15, at
76-77 [reprinted with slight modifications in 114 U. PA. L. Rzv. 140, 156-58 (1965)]. See
also PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 10,707-08 (Supp. 1972).
23 See Babcock et al., supra note 22, at 70-75 [114 U. PA. L. REv. 143-52]. See also
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10,705 (Supp. 1972).
24 See Babcock et al., supra note 22, at 73-81 [114 U. PA. L. REv. 159-67]. See also
PA. STAT. ANx. tit. 53, §§ 10,706, 10,709-11 (Supp. 1971).
2 5 The National Commission on Urban Problems recognized this relationship, stating:
"[large-scale projects, under unified planning and control, afford an important oppor-
tunity to create mixtures of housing types and to provide an environment in which people
of varied income levels can live." DouGLAs REPORT, supra note 5, at 247.
2 6
See MODEL LAm DEVELOPMENT CODE 170-72 (Commentary on Art. 3, Pt. 1)
(Tent. Draft No. 1, 1968) [hereinafter cited as MODEL CODE].
27TSee, e.g., Eves v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 401 Pa. 211, 164 A.2d 7 (1960).
See also Haar & Hering, The Lower Gwynedd Township Case: Too Flexible Zoning or
an Inflexible Judiciary?, 74 HARV. L. Rnv. 1552, 1557-66 (1961).
28 SZEA § 3. See also 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 11, § 5.02.
2 9 MODEL CODE, supra note 26, at 196 (Commentary on Art. 8).
so Id.
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the private developer makes his own decisions when, where, and to
what extent to build.31 If the zoning ordinance permits a certain use,
the township under end-state zoning theory may not tell a developer
that delay until a subsequent year would be preferable 32-it lacks
discretion to limit development. A limited amount of discretion was
available within the SZEA through the appeals mechanism, providing
for review of arbitrary decisions by administrative officers or of denials
of applications for a special exception or variance; 33 however, these
devices applied only under special circumstances.34
The principal means of discretionary decisionmaking (still osten-
sibly within the framework of end-state zoning) has been the amend-
ment. The SZEA recognized that although the administrative agency
was to be unwavering in its application of the zoning regulations, it
might be necessary to change those regulations from time to time. The
legislative body of the local municipality was, accordingly, granted
amendment power.35 With amendments, as with any other municipal
ordinance,36 courts are loath to inquire into the legislative motives. 7
Shielded by the doctrine of separation of powers, township supervisors
can escape end-state zoning's prohibition of discretionary decision-
making, by zoning the township so as to render development infeasible.
Development then takes place largely as a series of individual permis-
sions, granting those who will build as the community sees fit, relief
from the requirements no one is able to satisfy.3 Other techniques to
3
1 See, e.g., J. DErAaONs, supra note 8, at 108.
32 Cf. Albrecht Realty Co. v. Town of New Castle, 8 Misc. 2d 255, 167 N.Y.S.2d
843 (Sup. Ct. 1957) (ceiling on building-permit issuance held invalid).
83 SZEA § 7.
3 4 See, e.g., Mandelker, Delegation of Power and Function in Zoning Administration,
1963 WAsH. U.L.Q. 60; Note, Administrative Discretion in Zoning, 82 HARV. L. Rxv.
668, 671-73 (1969); Note, Zoning Variances, 74 HAv. L. REv. 1396 (1961). The abuse
of this statutory grant of discretion is documented by three field studies. See Dukeminier
& Stapleton, The Zoning Board of Adjustment: A Study in Misrule, 50 Ky. L.J. 273
(1962); Note, Zoning: Variance Administration in Alameda County, 50 CAnaI. L. Rav.
101 (1962); Note, Zoning Variances and Exceptions: The Philadelphia Experience, 103
U. PA. L. Rav. 516 (1955).
35 SZEA § 5. See generally 1 R. ANDERSoN, supra note 11, §§ 4.25-.37.
3 65 See, e.g., 1 R. ADERsoN, supra note 11, § 2.14. But see Haar & Hering, supra note
27, at 1565 & n.43.
3 7 See, e.g., Bilbar Constr. Co. v. Board of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 62, 71-72, 141 A.2d
851, 856 (1958); accord, Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386-89
(1926). But see Johnson, Constitutional Law and Community Planning, 20 LAW &
CONTFM. PROB. 199, 214-15 (1955).
88 See Krasnowiecki, The Basic System of Land Use Control: Legislative Preregula-
tion v. Administrative Discretion, in Tnx NEw ZONMIG 3 (N. Marcus & M. Groves eds.
1970). See, e.g., Valley View Village, Inc. v. Proffet, 221 F.2d 412 (6th Cir. 1955);
Connor v. Town of Chanhassen, 249 Minn. 205, 81 N.W.2d 789 (1957). The technique
does not always receive judicial approval, however. See Kimball v. Blanchard, 90 N.H.
298, 7 A.2d 394 (1939); Rockbill v. Chesterfield Twp., 23 NJ. 117, 128 A.2d 473 (1957);
cf. Town of Hobart v. Collier, 3 Wis. 2d 182, 87 N.W.2d 868 (1958); State ex rel.
Saveland P.H. Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217 (1955). See generally
Reno, Non-Euclidean Zoning: The Use of the Floating Zone, 23 Mo. L. REv. 105, 119-20
(1963); Reps, The Zoning of Undeveloped Areas, 3 SYRAcusE L. Rxv. 292 (1952); Note,
Non-Euclidean "Zoning": Its Theoretical Validity and Practical Desirability in Under-
developed Areas, 30 U. C. L. REv. 297 (1961).
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force a developer to ask for a rezoning are large-lot zoning,39 the com-
plete exclusion of apartments, 0 and minimum-house-size require-
ments
41
Municipalities, it is no secret, employ such devices in the service
of three major goals: negotiation with developers, regulation of devel-
opment pace, and exclusion of "incompatible" people 2 Attraction of
higher tax revenues and preservation of community rural appearance
are sometimes raised as additional considerations prompting low-
density zoning,43 but there is some doubt that either of these goals can
be advanced thereby.44 The three purposes first mentioned, however,
merit further discussion.
If it be one's purpose to provide low- and moderate-cost housing
in the suburbs, the least controversial aim of large-lot zoning should be
the township's bargaining with the developer. Few would hold illegiti-
mate a community's interest in securing a pleasant neighborhood
through high-quality new development, and the practice of reviewing a
builder's reputation and bargaining with him for concessions is widely
accepted. 5 In fact, the PUD approach encourages and legitimates this
bargaining process 4 -- a process not objectionable, provided there is an
impartial and open hearing and the township has the right to enforce
promises made by the developer.
The use of low-density zoning to control the timing of develop-
89 Recent cases tend to invalidate large-lot zoning. See, e.g., Concord Twp. Appeal,
439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970); National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Twp. Ed. of
Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965); Board of County Supervisors v. Carper,
200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959). But cf., e.g, Senior v. Zoning Comm'n, 146 Conn.
531, 153 A.2d 415 (1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 143 (1960). See also Note, Snob
Zoning-A Look at the Economic and Social Impact of Low Density Zoning, 15 SYRAcusz
L. Rav. 507, 508-11 (1964).
4 oSee Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). In recent years,
however, such zoning has generally been invalidated. See, e.g., Molino v. Mayor &
Council, 116 NJ. Super. 195, 281 A.2d 401 (Law Div. 1971); Girsh Appeal, 437 Pa.
237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970). See also Symposium, Apartments in Suburbia: Local Respon-
sibility and Judicial Restraints, 59 Nw. U.L. Rv. 344 (1964); Babcock & Bossehnan,
Suburban Zoning and the Apartment Boom, 111 U. PA. L. Rav. 1040 (1963). Siegan,
Non-Zoning in Houston, 13 J. LAw & EcoN. 71, 128 (1970), observes:
The relative absence of restrictions on apartment development has allowed
the market to satisfy the demand for apartments to a much greater degree
than could occur under zoning controls. Rents are probably less as a consequence
for most tenants. Among the beneficiaries are those tenants of lesser income
levels who have been able to afford new apartments but probably would have
been unable to do so if Houston had been zoned.
41 Compare Medinger Appeal, 377 Pa. 217, 104 A.2d 118 (1954), with Lionshead
Lake, Inc. v. Wayne Twp., 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693 (1952), appeal dismissed, 344 U.S.
919 (1953). See also Haar, Zoning for Minimum Standards: The Wayne Township Case,
66 HARv. L. REv. 1051 (1953); Nolan & Horack, How Small a House?-Zoning for
Minimum Space Requirements, 67 HARv. L. REv. 967 (1954).
4 2 See, e.g., DouGLAs REPORT, supra note 5, at 214.
4 3 See Cutler, Legal and Illegal Methods for Controlling Community Growth on
the Urban Fringe, 1961 Wis. L. Rav. 370, 380-81. See also Becker, The Police Power and
Minimum Lot Size Zoning-Part I: A Method of Analysis, 1969 WAsHr. U.L.Q. 263.
44 See Note, Snob Zoning-A Look at the Economic and Social Impact of Low
Density Zoning, 15 SYaAcUsE L. REv. 507, 514-18 (1964); cf. ULI, TECH. BuLL. No. 32,
The Effects of Large Lot Size in Residential Development 7-11 (1958).
45 See DouGLAs REPoRT, supra note 5, at 216-17.
46 See generally Symposium, supra note 16.
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ment 4 ---to coordinate its rate and sequence4S--is also understandable.
The static end-state zoning of the SZEA ill-suits a dynamic world. But
to say that a municipality has a legitimate interest in guiding its
growth, is not to say that all such control is legitimate: it is important
to distinguish the township that desires reasonably to time its develop-
ment from the one that wants to exclude everyone save the very rich.
Such distinctions are more readily made, just as bargaining with de-
velopers can more surely be kept untainted by the extension of special
favors, when the sub rosa exercise of discretion is rejected in favor of
open, fair procedures administered by bodies sensitive to the develop-
ment-timing needs of the larger community.
Finally, the use of low-density zoning to exclude people considered
undesirable by communities is an abuse of the amendment process
hardly to be countenanced. Direct and open exclusion on the basis of
race would be quickly invalidated. 9 Likewise, an ordinance clearly
prohibiting low-income families from living in a municipality would
stand little chance of success. However, these are the easy cases."
Zoning has its authority in the police power, and an ordinance whose
reasonable relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare is at least "fairly debatable" will be accorded judicial defer-
ence. Ordinances directly excluding blacks or the poor do not even
qualify as "fairly debatable"; however, one need not strain to hold
reasonable, or at the very least "fairly debatable," a decision by a
municipality to exclude small houses, small-acreage lots, or apartments.
The effect of such land-use regulations is to raise the price of land, and
therefore the price of a dwelling unit, beyond the reach of low-income
and even moderate-income families, in many cases.
It is in making possible the subtle form of discrimination last-
discussed that American zoning law is most susceptible of indictment.
Only dramatic remedial action will eliminate this possibility.
3. Regionalism-Role and Reality
Immediate control over land-use decisions probably must be left
in the hands of local governments." The right to participate in such
47 See DOUGLAS P ORT, supra note 5, at 214.
48 See Fagin, Regulating the Timing of Urban Development, 20 LAw & CONTEMI.
PROB. 298 (1955).
4 9 See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917); accord, In re Lee Sing, 43 F. 359
(N.D. Cal. 1890); cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). See also Lefcoe, The
Public Housing Referendum Case, Zoning, and the Supreme Court, 59 CaLir. L. Rav.
1384, 1405-09 (1971).
50Few cases decide whether a community can directly exclude poor families by
setting a minimum construction cost. See, e.g., County Comm'rs v. Ward, 186 Md. 330,
336, 340, 46 A.2d 684, 686, 688 (1946). See also Williams, Planning Law and the Supreme
Court:-II, 13 ZONING DIGEST 97, 108-10 (1961); Williams, Planning Law and Demo-
cratic Living, 20 LAw & CoNTrEa,. PROB. 317, 343-46 (1955). But see Sager, Tight
Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REv.
767, 790-93 (1969).
1 See L BABcocx, supra note 13, at 153. Of course, one more readily accepts such
a situation, if local governments are large enough, powerful enough, and well-informed
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decisions makes democracy more meaningful and more effective.52 This
accounts in part, no doubt, for the demands for power over their com-
munities made by urban neighborhood groups.53 At the same time,
attacks frequently are leveled against the parochialism of suburban
decisionmaking.5 4 The values of decentralization must be balanced
against the importance of pressing regional and national needs.55 Sub-
urban municipalities have been most effective in thwarting the attempts
of large numbers of city dwellers to relocate in the suburbs. 6 In light of
our history and tradition, it would be politically naive to believe that
control over land use could be wrested altogether from suburban mu-
nicipalities, but it is not unrealistic, at a minimum, to require that
decisions be made in light of regional needs.5 7 This Comment will urge
a more structured consideration of regional concerns.
C. Judicial Inadequacies
Court decisions have not brought about any substantial increase
in the construction of low- and moderate-income housing in the sub-
urbs. Four primary obstacles prevent the courts from responding effec-
tively to the problems posed by exclusionary zoning: (1) strong prece-
dent to the effect that only the avowed purpose, not the effect nor the
motive however fairly imputed, of zoning ordinances should be re-
viewed, (2) traditional limitations on standing, (3) the shortcomings of
the available substantive legal theories, and (4) the narrow range of
remedies available.
1. Early Limits on the Scope of Judicial Inquiry
At issue in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co."' was the
constitutionality of a zoning ordinance creating an entirely residential
district, which the plaintiff alleged denied him the use of his land for
enough to deal competently with problems. Cf. DouGLAs REiPORT, supra note 5, at 236-39.
See also Housing Act of 1949 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970).
52 Cf. Michelman, The Advent of a Right to Housing: A Current Appraisal, 5
HARv. Civ, RiGxTs-Civ. LiB. L. REv. 207, 225-26 (1970).
53 See generally David & Lewis, Citizen Participation, 20 J. HOUSING 472 (1963)
Note, Tenant Unions: Collective Bargaining and the Low-Income Tenant, 77 Ya L.
1368 (1968).
54 See, e.g., R. VERNON, THE MYTH AND REALITy OF OUR URBAN PROBLEarS 61-67
(1966) ; Babcock & Bosselman, supra note 40.
55 See Babcock & Bosselman, Citizen Participation; A Suburban Suggestion for the
Central City, 32 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 220, 222 (1967).
56See DoUGLAS RmEPoRT, supra note 5, at 18-20. See also Vickers v. Township
Comm., 37 N.J. 232, 252-70, 181 A.2d 129, 140-50 (1962) (Hall, J., dissenting), appeal
dismissed, 371 U.S. 233 (1963).
57 See R. BABcocE, supra note 13, at 153. Cf, DOUGLAS x0Raro, supra note 5, at 236:
[tjhe range of local actions must be effectively limited by the States and the
Federal Government, both to assure fair treatment of property owners and minor-
ities in each locality and to assure that local decisions will not place unfair, un-
economic, or unrealistic burdens on people who live outside a given local
jurisdiction.
58272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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commercial, industrial, or apartment uses, and commensurately dimin-
ished the value of his land. The lower court59 found the ordinance un-
constitutionally deprived plaintiff of his property without due process
of law. Noting that it served to further "class tendencies," District
Judge Westenhaver wrote:
The plain truth is that the true object of the ordinance in
question is to place all the property in an undeveloped
area of 16 square miles in a strait-jacket. The purpose to be
accomplished is really to regulate the mode of living of
persons who may hereafter inhabit it. In the last analysis,
the result to be accomplished is to classify the population and
segregate them according to their income or situation in life.6"
But this scrutiny of the unworthy motive was limited to the lower-
court opinion; - the Supreme Court confined its inquiry to whether
reasonable justifications could be advanced for the exclusion of apart-
ment houses.0 l The Court concluded that apartments "come very near to
being nuisances,"02 and held that under the circumstances the zoning
was a reasonable exercise of the police power. The issue of exclusionary
impact had not been presented to the Court by plaintiff, but munici-
palities could nevertheless feel safe in zoning to exclude low-income
families, so long as the overt purposes of their ordinance were at least
"fairly debatable." 3 It is obvious how ineffectual judicial review of
exclusionary zoning must be, under so narrow a scope of inquiry.
Despite the absence of leadership from the highest court,64 there is
growing judicial support for the proposition that a suburban munici-
pality may not utilize restrictive zoning to achieve the effect of exclud-
ing low-income familiesY0 However, the impact of these decisions is
limited by the other constraints under discussion here.
2. Limitations on Standing
One reason why courts have made so little progress towards
solving exclusionary-zoning problems is that standing is granted only
to select interest groups. As a result, classes of plaintiffs representing
vital viewpoints are denied a judicial hearing.
The SZFA makes no explicit provision for standing to appeal
decisions made by municipal legislatures; 66 the courts have filled this
59297 IF, 307 (N.D. Ohio 1924),
60 14. at 316.
61272 U.S. at 394.
621d. at 399.
63d. at 388.
64 The last zoning case heard by the Supreme Court was Nectow v. City of Cam-
bridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928), a fact suggesting tacit approval of subsequent lower-
court decisions.
65 See notes 38-41 supra & acconipaying test; rf. notes 49-50 supra & accompanying
text.66 c 5e also Krasnowiecd, supra note 18, at go.
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legislative gap by borrowing the SZEA standing requirements for
appeals of adjustment-board decisions.6
7
The question of standing frequently arises in the context of a dis-
pute over a developer's zoning-amendment petition. An amendment
might be sought when a developer feels an available tract of land is
zoned at a classification prohibitive of profitable development. The
dispute could arise whether the local legislature grants or denies the
amendment. If the amendment is denied, the developer usually has
standing to bring an action against the municipality."' If the amend-
ment is granted, neighboring residents usually have standing to pro-
test. 9 Nonresidents, however, have access to courts as parties to a
zoning dispute only in limited circumstances. 70
Thus, the courtroom doors are closed to those plaintiffs most
harmed, perhaps, by the amendment's denial and most likely to raise
regional concerns. Neighboring property owners are likely to oppose
all new development not calculated to attract people of their own
income brackets.7" And, although the developer may challenge the
community's zoning, it will most likely be for the purpose of building
luxury apartments, not low- and moderate-income housing.
72
3. Available Legal Theories
None of three theories commonly resorted to"8 affords significant
likelihood of judicial overturning of exclusionary zoning. Equal protec-
tion doctrine has not been, nor does it appear likely to be, stretched so
far. Due-process or breach-of-affirmative-duty theories, though they
may in some instances prevail, are as yet too undeveloped, or in any
event not sufficiently predictable, to justify reliance thereupon.
O7 SZEA § 7. See generally Ayer, The Primitive Law of Standing in Land Use
Disputes: Some Notes from a Dark Continent, 55 IowA L. RP. 344 (1969). See also
Foss, Interested Third Parties in Zoning, 12 U. FLA. L. Rxv. 16 (1959); Comment, The
"Aggrieved Person" Requirement in Zoning, 8 Wx. & MARY L. Rav. 294 (1967); Com-
ment, Standing to Appeal Zoning Determinations: The "Aggrieved Person" Requirement,
64 Mici. L. Rav. 1070 (1966).
08 Cf. Krasnowieckl, Zoning Litigation and the New Pennsylvania Procedures, 120
U. PA. L. Rav. 1029, 1054-57 (1972).
69 See, e.g., Wakefield v. Kraft, 202 Md. 136, 142-43, 96 A.2d 27, 29-30 (1953). Cf.
1 R. A DFRSON, supra note 11, §§ 5.05-.06.
70 See Hamelin v. Zoning Bd., 19 Conn. Supp. 445, 117 A.2d 86 (C.P. New Haven
1955); Koppel v. City of Fairway, 189 Kan. 710, 371 P.2d 113 (1962); Al Walker, Inc.
v. Borough of Stanhope, 23 N.J. 657, 130 A.2d 372 (1957); Note, Extending Standing
to Nonresidents-A Response to the Exclusionary Effects of Zoning Fragmentation, 24
VAND. L. REV. 341 (1971). See also Comment, Standing to Challenge Exclusionary Local
Zoning Decisions: Restricted Access to State Courts and the Alternative Federal Forum,
22 SYAacusa L. REv. 598 (1971). But ef. Note, 38 N.Y.U.L. REV. 161 (1963).
71 See R. BABcocx, supra note 13, at 1-32, 48-49.
72 See, e.g., Strong, Girsh and Kit-Mar: An Unlikely Route to Equal Opportunity in
Housing, 22 ZoNING DIOST 100a (1970).
73 See generally Marcus, Exclusionary Zoning: The Need for a Regional Planning
Context, 16 N.Y.L.F. 732 (1970); Williams & Norman, Exclusionary Land Use Controls:
The Case of North-Eastern New Jersey, 22 SYRAcUsE L. Rfv. 475, 498-502 (1971);
Comment, A Survey of the Judicial Responses to Exclusionary Zoning, 22 SRACUSE
L. REV. 537 (1971).
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a. Equal Protection
The proposition that low-density zoning denies nonresident poor
families the equal protection of the law has been urged by several
commentators,74 although no court has yet reached this conclusion.75
The commentators argue that low-density zoning increases the cost of
each dwelling unit in a suburban community to the point where poor
and moderate-income families are denied entry. The result is that
persons are classified, as respects their access to suburban land, in a
manner without valid countervailing justification. Such an invidious
classification, the argument runs, unfairly discriminates against the
poor, and by implication against blacks and other minorities, and there-
fore constitutes a denial of equal protection.7"
The commentators distinguish between the old equal protection
and the new, more active, equal protection. The traditional view is that
government must merely be rational in its distribution of benefits and
burdens. The "new equal protection" calls for a more searching judi-
cial balancing of the public interest advanced against the private loss
inflicted as a result of any legislation, even legislation appearing neutral
on its face, whenever the line drawn involves a "suspect classification"
or a "fundamental interest." 77
In Lindsey v. Normet the Supreme Court refused to hold hous-
ing to be a fundamental interest 8 despite earlier concern about the
right to equal housing opportunity.7" The case involved, among other
things, an equal protection challenge to Oregon's judicial procedure
requiring an early trial and limiting litigable issues for the eviction
of tenants for nonpayment of rent. The rationale rejecting the attack
went beyond the facts and demonstrated an unwillingness to extend
any further the new equal protection."
We do not denigrate the importance of decent, safe, and
sanitary housing. But the Constitution does not provide judi-
cial remedies for every social and economic ill. We are unable
to perceive in that document any constitutional guarantee of
7 4 See Sager, supra note go. See also Aloi & Goldberg, Racial and Economic Ex-
clusionary Zoning: The Beginning of the End?, in 1971 URBAN LAw ANN. 9; Michelman,
Forword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HeARv. L.
REv. 7 (1969); Note, Exclusionary Zoning and Equal Protection, 84 HAnv. L. REv.
1645 (1971); Note, Snob Zoning: Must a Man's Home Be a Castle?, 69 M.IE. L. REv.
339 (1970); Note, The Constitutionality of Local Zoning, 79 YALn. L.J. 896 (1970).
.75 Cf. Concord Twp. Appeal, 439 Pa. 466, 474 n.6, 263 A.2d 395, 399 n.6 (1970).
76 Aloi & Goldberg, supra note 74, at 12-17.
77 See, e.g., Note, Exclusionary Zoning and Equal Protection, 84 Haav. L. Rev.
1645, 1650-53 (1971). Cf. Lefcoe, supra note 49, at 1425-28.
78 405 U.S. 56, 73-74 (1972). Cf. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (implicitly
balancing the interest in decent housing against the right of residents of a community to
control their environment, in favor of the latter).
79 See note 3 supra & accompanying text.
80 Cf. Gunther, Forword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HAnv. L. REV. 1 (1972).
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access to dwellings of a particular quality or any recognition
of the right of a tenant to occupy the real property of his
landlord beyond the term of his lease, without the payment
of rent or otherwise contrary to the terms of the relevant
agreement. Absent constitutional mandate, the assurance of
adequate housing and the definition of landlord-tenant rela-
tionships are legislative, not judicial, functionsY'
Institutional, as well as doctrinal, difficulties would follow, were
the Court to hold that large-acreage zoning might deny equal protec-
tion. Since, as seems not unreasonable, such zoning might be legitimate
at times,8 2 a heavy burden would be placed on the lower federal courts
to pick their way through various ordinances, weighing each on its
merits-a substantive-land-use-planning involvement that state courts
have been avoiding for years.
83
Equal protection doctrine, then, cannot be relied upon to equip
the courts with any solution to exclusionary-zoning problems.
b. Due Process
The substantive-due-process theory, under which it is urged that
exclusionary zoning does not permit property owners to use their land
reasonably, involves a tension between the local municipality and the
developer.84 The municipality's desire to maintain an attractive en-
vironment must be balanced against the profits which a developer
could possibly realize. In the past, courts have tended to uphold the
ordinances, ruling that large-acreage zoning is reasonably related to
legitimate legislative goals-preserving open space, avoiding a drain on
municipal services, or maintaining the existing property values.8 5
Recent decisions of the Pennsylvania Supreme CourtS6 have demon-
strated a receptiveness to due-process claims, but due-process theory
nevertheless can not be relied upon to resolve the concerns raised in
this Comment. There is no necessary identity of interest between the
developer (the only participant in such disputes as to whom the lost-
profits claim so important to substantive-due-process arguments under
discussion here makes sense) and excluded nonresidents.
87
81405 U.S. at 74.
82 See notes 44-48 supra & accompanying text.
83 See R. BABcocz, supra note 13, at 104-05.
84 See, e.g., Sager, supra note 50, at 784.
85 See Comment, supra note 73, at 538-62.
86 See, e.g., National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Twp. Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa.
504, 532, 215 A.2d 597, 612 (1965) (overturning four-acre residental zoning): "A zoning
ordinance whose primary purpose is to prevent the entrance of newcomers in order to
avoid future burdens, economic and otherwise, upon the administration of public services
and facilities can not be held valid." See also Concord Twp. Appeal, 439 Pa. 466, 268
A.2d 765 (1970). Similar stirrings have taken place in Virginia. See Board of Supervisors
v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959).
87 See, e.g., Williams & Norman, supra note 73, at 498-502; cf. Strong, supra note
72. See generally Williams, Planning Law and the Supreme Court: I, 13 ZoNmG DIGEST
57 (1961).
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c. Affirmative Duty
The third, and perhaps most promising, theory is that munici-
palities have an affirmative duty to plan for regional needs-and, par-
ticularly, an obligation to accommodate low- and moderate-income
families desiring to move into them. Recent New Jersey decisions sug-
gest such an affirmative duty may be held to flow from some not-
unusual statutory provisions. In DeSimone v. Greater Englewood
Housing Corp. No. 1,11 the Supreme Court of New Jersey upheld the
granting of a use variance for the construction of a low- and moderate-
income housing project. Under New Jersey law, a variance could only
be issued if there existed "special reasons," defined by the court as
including the promotion of "health, morals or general welfare."'8 9 The
court held that the attempt to relieve the shortage of low- and mod-
erate-income housing fell within the definition of the general welfare,
and therefore was a "special reason" justifying a variance. In Oakwood
at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison,0 plaintiffs, two developers
and six nonresidents, challenged the constitutionality of low-density
zoning on the theory that it ignored regional housing needs. The
superior court found the ordinance was invalid, because not in com-
pliance with the mandate to zone for the "general welfare":
The general welfare does not stop at the municipal boundary.
Large areas of vacant and developable land should not be
zoned, as Madison Township has, into such minimum lot sizes
and with such other restrictions that regional as well as local
housing needs are shunted aside. 1
Affirmative-duty theories, while interesting, yet represent an undevel-
oped area of law, and if relied upon, may prove unsuccessful.
4. Lack of a Satisfactory Remedy
Even if any standing hurdles are overcome and an exclusionary
zoning ordinance is declared invalid, there is no assurance that low-
and moderate-income housing will be built in that municipality. First,
a court will not order a municipal officer to issue a building permit
unless it is clear on the record that all the requirements necessary for
one have been met. Generally the court does not have the expertise to
decide, on less than a clear showing, if a particular plan meets even the
basic minimum standards for safe or livable housing. Second, unless the
land immediately in question is already zoned for the developer's
desired use, the township can frustrate his expectations by making
88 56 N.J. 428, 267 A.2d 31 (1970). Cf. Molino v. Mayor & Council, 116 N.J. Super.
195, 281 A.2d 401 (Law Div. 1971).
89 56 N.J. at 440, 267 A.2d at 37.
90 117 N.J. Super. 11, 283 A.2d 353 (Law Div. 1971). Cf. Borough of Creskill v.
Borough of Dumont, 15 N.J. 238, 104 A.2d 441 (1954) ("comprehensive plan" must
consider regional interests).
91 117 N.J. Super. at 20-21, 283 A.2d at 358.
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"available" other land for the use judicially called for. 2 Finally, a
developer must be willing and able to build-this decision remains in
private hands.
5. Summary
The courts, then, are powerless. Powerless to force low-income
housing to be built. Powerless to bring conventional theories to bear
with any palpable impact on the problem. Powerless even to hear many
a case in this area, given the limitations of standing. And powerless,
within the Euclid tradition, to focus on discriminatory effect or motive,
given a rational basis for a zoning enactment. Solution to our zoning
and housing problems, then, must be sought elsewhere.
II. APPROACHING A SOLUTION
A. The Proposal
A new statutory scheme for zoning should be established, em-
bracing a two-part quota system and a statewide reviewing agency,
possibly with regional branches. The scheme would be so designed that
municipalities would set quotas with an eye to both regional needs and
the suburban communities' legitimate interests. In effect, low-density
zoning already results in a quota system protective of the latter
interests; this proposal, therefore, is revolutionary only, if at all, in its
call for such quotas' being endorsed by state legislatures and being
made to answer, not frustrate, regional needs.
A township would discharge its obligation to accept its fair share
of the regional demand for low- and moderate-income housing either
by accepting public housing or by requiring, through the zoning ordi-
nance, that private developers include, in PUDs or other multi-family
housing projects, at least stipulated percentages of low- and moderate-
income housing units. 3 In practice, many developers will be able,
through the Department of Housing and Urban Development, to obtain
federal subsidies for such public-interest housing. Of course, HUD's
processing of grant-applications is notoriously slow, its cost-limits are
low, and the absolute quantity of money available is limited. 4 How-
ever, a developer's inability to obtain federal subsidy need not, and
92 For the aftermath of Girsh Appeal, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970), see
Krasnowiecki, supra note 68, at 1080-82.
9 Fairfax County, Virginia, requires all developers proposing to build more than So
units in PUD or multi-family-housing zones are required to reserve at least 15% of
the units for low- and middle-income housing, including at least 6% for low-income
housing. See FAwxI-X CouNTY, VA., CODE, Ch. 30 (1961). Although the ordinance was
immediately invalidated, primarily on the ground that the county supervisors had ex-
ceeded their statutory authority, an appeal is pending. DeGroff Enterprises, Inc. v.
Board of Supervisors, Law No. 25,609 (Cir. Ct. Fairfax Co., Nov. 11, 1971), writ
granted, No. 8118, Sup. Ct. Va., Oct. 24, 1972.
04 See Lefcoe, supra note 49, at 1445-47. See also Low and Moderate Income
Housing: Zoning Ordinance Changes 4-8, June 29, 1971 (unpublished report by Fairfax
County Supervisors' Committee appointed June 16, 1971), copsf on file in Biddle Law
Library, Univ. of Pa. [hereinafter cited as Committee Report].
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should not, entail waiver of the unit-percentage requirement.9 5 An
innovative use of housing-density bonuses, especially for large-scale
developments, could easily compensate developers for any financial
burdens occasioned by the requirement to construct low-income
housing 86 Of still greater financial benefit to the developer would be the
allowance of additional square footage for commercial uses; assuming
purchase of his land was effected at a price not reflecting such uses, he
would receive an indirect subsidy. In the case of smaller developments,
with respect to which density bonuses or increased commercial develop-
ment might be unacceptable to the township, other subdivision exac-
tions could be waived.97 In sum, the provision of low- and moderate-
income housing need by no means be dependent upon federal funding.
To encourage willing adoption of such a quota requirement by
local governments, and to make operation under the scheme fair among
localities in the same region, a second quota-a growth quota-would
be authorized. Thus, the system would relieve anxieties that a com-
munity, by its receptiveness to low-income housing, might accommo-
date more than its share.
In preparing the growth quota, the township would be required
to determine what portion of the regional demand for housing, of all
types and price ranges, is its "fair share." Relevant considerations in
gauging its capacity for growth will include its ecological and geo-
graphical features, its sewers, streets, schools, and commercial facilities,
and its prospects for financing capital improvements for these services.
On the basis of such information, the township would project a reason-
able rate of population growth for the next five-year period. For each
year thereafter, each community would be required to prepare an
annual planning report,9" containing, in addition to capacity informa-
tion as in the original report, sections relating to the land-use and de-
velopment decisions made during the year, the degree of success
achieved by the community in reaching its housing goals, and any pro-
posed modifications to the plan. The community would thus be forced
to engage in a constant planning effort.
Flexible development should be the keynote. If a community
permits development so that its five-year quota is fulfilled in the
period's first twelve months, it would then be allowed to deny per-
mission to build for the next four. If essential facilities must be con-
structed before a township can withstand further growth, development
9 5 The Fairfax County scheme provides just such a waiver. See note 93 supra.
O See, e.g., Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HAnv. L. REv. 1165, 1218 (1967). Density
bonuses are provided by the Fairfax County ordinance, see note 93 supra, at the rate of
one additional high-income unit for each two low- or moderate-income units.
97 Cf. Committee Report, supra note 94, at 9.
98 Cf. Krasnowiedd, Model Land Use and Development Planning Code §§ 209, 303
& Notes, in MARyLm PLANxmNG & ZoNInG LAW S=tDY Com ', FINAL REPORT: LEars-
LATIE RECOmIEDATxONS 107-12, 113-16 (1969).
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might fairly be postponed until these facilities are built-provided its
full five-year quota is nevertheless met. Should it become apparent
only at the end of five years that a community has failed to meet its
quota, then a new quota will be imposed upon the township to recoup
the deficit. But if a community fails to reach its goal not through
municipal foot-dragging, but rather because of lack of home-buyer
and developer interest, then it may be excused from making up the
deficit.
The fair administration of such a flexibly-applied system will
require a statewide reviewing agency, staffed by planners as well as by
lawyers. The agency would supply municipalities with needed statis-
tical information, would pass upon their quotas (with regional interests
considered paramount over local concerns), and-aided by their annual
filings-would monitor their performance and commitment to the goal
of developing low- and moderate-income housingP9 So broad would be
the state agency's power to review all decisions affecting the application
of low- and moderate-income housing quotas, °0 that no appeal to the
courts would be allowed until the agency had considered the matter at
issue. 01 When passing upon such local actions, the reviewing agency
would be empowered to approve (with or without modification) or to
veto the action;' 02 in short, "[i]t should be empowered to substitute
its decisions in adjudicatory matters for those of the locality." 03
Traditional judicial and statutory rules limiting when, and by
whom, suits may be brought, should be abolished. In order to hasten
certainty with regard to land-use actions, plaintiffs should be required
to bring their challenges within thirty days,0 4 and challenges should be
allowed whenever "there is no reasonable possibility that the restriction
can be avoided" 05 by recourse directly to the local body. Standing
should be broadly defined, so that the state reviewing agency can
99 Cf. id. The need for a state agency with broad powers to plan and administer
land-use controls has frequently been noted by commentators. See Haar, Regionalism and
Realism in Land-Use Planning, 105 U. PA. L. Rrv. 515 (1957). See also Becker, Municipal
Boundaries and Zoning: Controlling Regional Land Development, 1966 WASH. U.L.Q. 1;
Bowe, Regional Planning Versus Decentralized Land-Use Controls-Zoning for the
Megalopolis, 18 DEPAu. L. REv. 144 (1968); Clark, The Extension of Political and
Legal Order to the Metropolitan Area Community, 111 U. PA. L. REv 855 (1963);
Comment, Recent Trends in State Planning Legislation: A Selective Survey, 16 BUErALO
L. REv. 801 (1967); Note, The Regional Approach to Planning, 50 IowA L. REv. 582
(1965); Note, Regional Impact of Zoning: A Suggested Approach, 114 U. PA. L. Rxv.
1251 (1966).
10oSee, e.g., DouoLAs REPORT, supra note 5, at 239-40; MODEL CODE, supra note 26,
§ 7-205.
101 See, e.g., DouGLAs REPORT, supra note 5, at 240. In order to promote efficient and
optimally-informed operation of the state agency, its subdivision into regional (metro-
politan-area) authorities may appear desirable. Cf., e.g., VT. STAT. Amr. fit. 10, §§ 6026(a),
6083, 6086 (Supp. 1972); IAwAir REv. LAws §§ 205-3 et seq. (Supp. 1971). See also
Denney, State Zoning in Hawaii: The State Land-Use Law, 18 ZoNwnG DIGEST 89 (1966).
102 Cf. MODEL CODE, supra note 26, §§ 401(5), 402(5) (b) & Commentary.
1 03 DouGLAs REPORT, supra note 5, at 240.
104 Cf. MODEL CODE, supra note 26, §§ 401(2), 402(2) & Commentary.
105 Id. § 402(4).
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consider all relevant interests. Standing, certainly, should be retained
by the developer and by neighboring property owners, but should also
be held to extend to neighboring municipalities and nonresidents and
to the staff of the state reviewing agency-groups representing vital
interests in land-use controversies over low- and moderate-income
housing. The inner-city community ought to have the opportunity to
protest, if a suburb does not responsibly set its quotas. Suburban
municipalities, similarly, should be able to assert that another com-
munity is not assuming its "fair share" of regional new-housing needs,
which fall more heavily, as a result, on the cooperating municipalities.
Finally, within the framework here proposed, the reviewing agency
would itself remain subordinate ultimately to the state legislature,
which would articulate broad policies and establish statewide housing
goals with special emphasis on low- and moderate-income housing. To
aid the legislature in establishing the statewide quota, the agency would
gather information on the condition, capacity, and location of present
low- and moderate-income housing, of public utilities, and of other
relevant facilities, 106 and would determine the demand for low- and
moderate-income housing. The statewide housing quota having been
established by the legislature, the reviewing agency would be em-
powered to adopt rules and regulations to ensure that local decisions
are consistent with state goals.
The framework proposed is, to be sure, much more elaborate than
that producing zoning decisions today. But given the need for external
checks on local government and for regional accountability, and given
also the inherently local nature of land-use planning, it is unlikely that
one could confidently entrust the accomplishment of so important a
goal as the provision of better housing to a lesser administrative
scheme.
B. Potential Problems
Although there may be some concern that either or both quotas
constitute takings of the developer's property, for which just compen-
sation must be paid, or that the quota system may deny equal protec-
tion to some developers, neither theory poses a serious constitutional
threat to the proposal here advanced. The low-income housing require-
ment is similar in effect to more conventional subdivision exactions,
such as those for streets, schools, sewers, and parks, which have been
generally upheld when found reasonable by a judicially-determined
standard. 0 7 Even if the quota can be characterized as a "taking," it will
be compensated for in kind by the density and commercial bonuses. 08
10 6 See Haar, supra note 99, at 518-20.
'0 7 See Heyman & Gilhool, The Constitutionality of Imposing Increased Community
Costs on New Suburban Residents Through Subdivision Exactions, 73 YA.L, LJ. 1119
(1964).
1o8 See, e.g., Mcihelman, supra note 96, at 1218.
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The growth quota should not be considered a taking because the de-
veloper, although prevented from building because a goal has been
reached, has not had his speculative profits taken altogether, but rather
has simply had their receipt postponed. 09
Finally, a developer might raise an equal-protection question by
claiming that there is no real difference between his proposed project
and one already allowed by the legislature. The fact that he sought a
building permit second, he would argue, does not justify denial of his
request. When an economic regulation is under attack,110 however, "[a]
statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts
reasonably may be conceived to justify it.""' A court will only set
aside legislation that is "invidious" or "arbitrary." 112 Although devel-
opment timing has not in the past been viewed as a valid discriminating
factor in zoning, this may be explained as a result of traditional end-
state, anti-discretionary zoning theory-a theory that grew increasingly
out of line with the reality of unrestrained, covert discretionary deci-
sionmaking by the local legislatures. The proposed legislation would
legitimate the use of discretion and of a timing mechanism (the growth
quota), in order to achieve a more rational and equitable system of
land-use controls. To permit discrimination on a "first-come" basis is
hardly invidious, since the class of those discriminated against is im-
possible to predict in advance, is not closed, and will be constantly
shifting.
C. Prospects
Perhaps the most significant concerns one might have with respect
to the quota approach are whether it would be accepted and whether
it would work effectively. At least one suburban county has in fact
adopted a very similar scheme. Fairfax County, Virginia, did so," 3
apparently because it believed there was a need for low- and moderate-
income housing nearer the factories and plants which have been re-
locating in the suburbs."' Even though the invalidation of Fairfax's
scheme may be reversed on appeal, time would be needed to determine
to what extent it will succeed, especially absent a regional authority.
Regional cooperation in the distribution of low- and moderate-
income housing has seen some success. In Ohio, the Miami Valley
Regional Planning Commission convinced suburban municipalities to
109 Cf. Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 138 N.Y.S.2d 334
(1972) ; DouLAs REPoRT, supra note 5, at 245-46 (delays occasioned through proposed
"holding zones" thought not so restrictive as to constitute takings).
110 See Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 465-66 (1957).
Il1 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961).
112 Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 732 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.,
348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
113 For details of the Fairfax scheme see notes 93-96 supra.
114 See Lefcoe, supra note 49, at 1448-49.
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accept such housing." 5 Although some communities have retreated
from their earlier enthusiasm, the program can claim to have been
rather effective. In January 1969, neither public housing nor FHA-
assisted housing projects could be found outside of Dayton. Within
four years, 1354 units were built or under construction outside Dayton,
and 2723 were proposed to be constructed by agreement.",6 The largest
part of the advance is as yet only a promise; some doubt that all the
proposed housing will materialize. The attitude in Dayton is optimistic,
however, and the feeling exists that despite its difficulties the program
can work."
7
Although the assumption that suburbs will violently oppose any
diminution of their power is probably still warranted in theory,"' it
is not unrealistic to expect they could consider it in their own self-
interest to endorse the proposal recommended here. Suburbs would be
enabled, through the five-year growth quotas, to rely on orderly de-
velopment. Exclusionary zoning techniques may succeed in delaying,
but can not succeed in scheduling, growth. They are also somewhat
unpredictable, due to the vagaries of litigation, and do not permit such
free bargaining with developers as has been proposed. Similarly, the
low- and moderate-income housing quota may appear more attractive
than the risk of unrestrained development of low- and moderate-income
housing after a costly court battle. State courts are with increasing
frequency invalidating zoning which has the effect of excluding low-
and moderate-income families," 9 and the fear of taking more than its
"fair share" of such families may induce many a community to back
the quota plan. Finally, suburban municipalities may reckon regional
control of some sort to be inevitable, and would wisely prefer a scheme
seeking maximum local control (consistent with regional needs) to
eventual regional control or perhaps even metropolitan government.
At the state level, adoption of a regulatory scheme such as that
described above would not be unprecedented. Both the Massachusetts
anti-snob zoning legislation,120 requiring every suburban municipality
to make available to non-profit or limited-profit housing sponsors at
least 0.3 percent of its vacant land each year for a five-year period, and
115 See Miami Valley Regional Planning Commission, A Housing Plan for the
Miami Valley Region: A Summary Including Housing Policies as Amended Dec. 1, 1971;
Bertsch & Shafor, A Regional Housing Plan: The Miami Valley Regional Planning Com-
mission Experience, 1 PLsxEaR's Nomoon 1 (1971) (reprint); Craig, The Dayton
Area's "Fair Share" Housing Plan, CITY, Jan./Feb. 1972, at 6-7 (reprint) (author's
numbering).
116 iami Valley Regional Planning Comm'n, Housing Program Progress Report,
Oct. 1972, copy on file at Biddle Law Library, Univ. of Pa.
117 Craig, supra note 115, at 7.
118 See Bowe, supra note 99, at 164; Haar, supra note 99, at 535.
119 See notes 38-41, 49-50, 86 supra & accompanying text.
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MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 40B, §§ 20-23 (Supp. 1971). See Legislative Developments,
Snob Zoning: Developments in Massachusetts and New Jersey, 7 HARv. J. LEGIS. 246
(1970).
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New York's Urban Development Corporation legislation, 1 intended
to prevent local governments from blocking housing developments
found to be in the regional interest, provide analogously for the over-
turning of local decisions insensitive to larger needs. Similarity may
also be found in environmental-protection schemes, such as that of
Vermont,112 providing for regional and statewide supervision of land
utilization.
In sum, the outlook is as promising as the opportunities. Granted,
the opening of America's suburbs is an ambitious goal, and lawyers by
nature are distrustful of pat solutions. But the difficulties that may
present themselves should prompt us to redouble, not abandon, our
efforts.
1
2 1 N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 6251 et seq. (McKinney Supp. 1970).
12 2
VT. STAT. AN. fit. 10, § 6001 et seq. (Supp. 1972).
